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This paper estimates the “jobs multiplier” of fiscal stimulus spending using the state-level 
allocations of federal stimulus funds from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
(ARRA) of 2009.  Because the level and timing of stimulus funds that a state receives was 
potentially endogenous, I exploit the fact that most of these funds were allocated according to 
exogenous formulary allocation factors such as the number of federal highway miles in a state or 
its youth share of population.  Cross-state IV results indicate that ARRA spending in its first year 
yielded about eight jobs per million dollars spent, or $125,000 per job. 
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“Not for the first time, as an elected official, I envy economists. Economists have available to 
them, in an analytical approach, the counterfactual.... They can contrast what happened to what 
would have happened. No one has ever gotten reelected where the bumper sticker said, ‘It would 
have been worse without me.’ You probably can get tenure with that. But you can't win office.” 
U.S. Representative Barney Frank, July 21, 2009.  (Washington Post, 2009) 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
This paper analyzes the fiscal stimulus spending provided by the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 and contrasts “what happened to what would have 
happened.”  It does so by exploiting the cross-sectional geographic variation in ARRA spending 
and the many exogenous factors that determined that variation.  The use of cross-sectional 
variation, in contrast to most prior studies of the economic effects of fiscal policy which rely on 
time series variation, greatly mitigates the risk of confounding fiscal policy effects with effects 
from other macroeconomic factors, such as monetary policy, that are independent of the 
geographic distribution of stimulus funds.  In addition, because the level and timing of ARRA 
funds that a state receives is potentially endogenous with respect to its economic conditions, I 
make use of the fact that most of these funds were allocated according to statutory formulas 
based on exogenous factors such as the number of highway lane-miles in a state or the youth 
share of its population.  I also utilize data on the initial announcements and obligations of ARRA 
funding by state, as opposed to actual outlays, to mitigate concerns about anticipation effects and 
implementation lags, the importance of which has been stressed in a number of recent studies.
1  
Specifically, I provide instrumental variables (IV) estimates of the impact on employment of 
ARRA spending announcements, obligations, and outlays using instruments based on these 
formulary factors and controlling for variables that might be correlated with both the instruments 
and employment outcomes.  
The ARRA was enacted into law in February 2009 amidst a great deal of economic and 
political debate.  At roughly $800 billion, it was one of the largest fiscal stimulus programs in 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Leeper, Walker, and Yang (2009), Ramey (2011), and Mertens and Ravn (2010). 4 
 
American history.
2  Proponents saw the stimulus package as a vital lifeline for an economy 
heading toward a second Great Depression.  They pointed to projections from the White House 
and others suggesting that the stimulus package would create or save around 3.5 million jobs in 
its first two years.  Critics claimed the massive cost of the ARRA would unduly swell the federal 
deficit while having minimal or even negative impact on employment and economic growth. 
The policy debate over the effectiveness of the ARRA has centered around, and revived 
interest in, the long-standing economic debate over the size of fiscal multipliers.  Ramey (2011) 
surveys the literature on fiscal multipliers, pointing out that there is little consensus either 
theoretically or empirically on the size of the multiplier.  As the quote at the beginning of the 
paper alludes to, the key challenge faced by researchers estimating the economic effects of fiscal 
policy is isolating changes in economic outcomes due solely to government spending from what 
would have occurred in the absence of that spending.  This paper turns to cross-sectional 
geographic variation in government spending to identify fiscal effects, exploiting the fact that 
other potentially confounding nationwide factors such as monetary policy are independent of 
relative spending and relative economic outcomes across regions.  Other recent papers also have 
followed this approach.  Nakamura and Steinsson (2010) use cross-region variation in U.S. 
military spending to estimate an “open economy” fiscal multiplier, instrumenting for actual 
spending using a region’s historical sensitivity to aggregate defense spending.  Serrato and 
Wingender (2010) consider variation in federal spending directed to U.S. counties and take 
advantage of the natural experiment afforded by the fact that much federal spending is allocated 
based on population estimates that are exogenously “shocked” after each Decennial Census.   
Shoag (2010) estimates the multiplier associated with state-level government spending driven by 
exogenous shocks to state pension fund returns.  Fishback and Kachanovskaya (2010) estimate a 
fiscal multiplier using variation across states in federal spending during the Great Depression.  
The results of Fishback and Kachanovskaya are particularly relevant here in that they, like this 
paper, investigate the fiscal multiplier during a time of considerable factor underutilization, when 
the multiplier should be at its largest according to traditional Keynesian theory.  Fishback and 
Kachanovskaya find that government spending had a negligible impact on employment during 
the 1930s. 
                                                 
2  When it was first passed, the ARRA was estimated to cost $787 billion over ten years.  Most recent estimates put 
the cost at $821 billion, of which about two-thirds comes from increased federal government spending and one third 
from reduced tax revenues (see Congressional Budget Office 2011). 5 
 
Fiscal multipliers estimated from cross-regional variation are, strictly speaking, “local” 
multipliers.  That is, they correspond most closely to contexts in which output and factors of 
production are at least partially mobile across borders.  To the extent that mobility is greater 
among sub-national regions than among countries, the local multiplier may be a lower bound on 
the national multiplier, especially in tradable goods sectors (see Moretti 2010).
3  On the other 
hand, the multipliers estimated from cross-sectional studies may be larger than a national 
multiplier because of the independence between the geographic allocation of spending and the 
geographic allocation of the financing of that spending.  For instance, suppose a single region 
received 100% of federal government spending.  The burden imposed by that spending on the 
federal government’s budget constraint will be shared by taxpayers in all regions.  In this sense, 
cross-sectional studies provide estimates of the multiplier associated with unfunded government 
spending, which could have a higher short-run multiplier than that of deficit-financed spending if 
agents are forward-looking. 
Of course, the fact that the local multiplier may not equal the national multiplier does not 
mean that the local multiplier is not of independent interest, nor does it mean that the local 
multiplier cannot inform the debate surrounding the effectiveness of federal stimulus.  In the 
U.S. and many other countries with federalist systems, a large share of federal spending comes in 
the form of regional transfers.  The economic impact of these transfers is of first-order 
importance.  In addition, this paper provides evidence on how the employment effects of ARRA 
spending changed over time.  The factors potentially causing a gap between the local and 
national multiplier (interregional factor mobility and the extent to which agents are forward-
looking) are likely to be fairly constant over time, implying that the national effects evolved over 
time similarly to the local effects.  
Since the ARRA’s passage, a number of studies have sought to measure its economic 
effects.  The methodologies used in these studies can be divided into two broad categories.  The 
first methodology employs a large-scale macroeconometric model to obtain a baseline, no-
stimulus forecast and compares that to a simulated forecast where federal government spending 
includes the ARRA.  This is the methodology used in widely-cited reports by the Congressional 
                                                 
3 Ilzetski, Mendoza, and Végh (2010), in their cross-country panel study, find evidence that the fiscal spending 
multiplier is lower in open economies than in closed economies.  To the extent that sub-national regions within the 
U.S. are more open than the national economy, this result suggests that the local multiplier estimated for these 
regions may indeed be a lower bound for the national multiplier. 6 
 
Budget Office (CBO) (see, e.g., CBO 2011), the White House’s Council of Economic Advisers 
(CEA) (e.g., CEA 2011), private forecasters such as Macroeconomic Advisers, IHS Global 
Insight, and Moody’s Economy.com, as well as a number of academic studies.
4  T h e  k e y  
distinction between that methodology and the one followed in this paper is that the former does 
not use observed data on economic outcomes following the start of the stimulus.  Rather, it relies 
on a macroeconometric model, the parameters of which, including its fiscal spending 
multiplier(s), are estimated using historical data prior to the ARRA (or pulled from the literature 
which estimated them using historical data).
5 
The second methodology is an attempt to count the jobs created or saved by requiring 
“prime” (or “first-round”) recipients of certain types of ARRA funds to report the number of jobs 
they were able to add or retain as a direct result of projects funded by the ARRA.  These counts 
are aggregated up across all reporting recipients by the Recovery Accountability and 
Transparency Board (RATB) – the entity established by the ARRA and charged with ensuring 
transparency with regard to the use of ARRA funds – and reported online at www.recovery.gov 
and in occasional reports to Congress.
6  The number of jobs created or saved, and any fiscal 
multiplier implied by such a number, reflects only “first-round” jobs tied to ARRA spending, 
such as hiring by contractors and their immediate subcontractors working on ARRA funded 
projects, and excludes both “second-round” jobs created by lower-level subcontractors and jobs 
created indirectly due to spillovers such as consumer spending made possible by the wages 
associated with these jobs and possible productivity growth made possible by ARRA-financed 
infrastructure improvements.  By contrast, the methodology of this paper uses employment totals 
as reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and therefore all direct and indirect jobs created by 
the ARRA should be reflected in the results.  Furthermore, only 55% of ARRA spending is 
covered by these recipient reporting requirements (see CEA 2010, p.27). 
The methodology I employ in this paper is distinct from the above two methodologies in 
that it uses both observed data on macroeconomic outcomes – namely, employment – and 
observed data on actual ARRA stimulus spending.  This paper was the first, to my knowledge, to 
exploit the cross-sectional, geographic variation in ARRA spending to estimate its economic 
                                                 
4 See, for example, Cogan, et al. (2009), Blinder and Zandi (2010), and Drautzburg and Uhlig (2010). 
5 CEA (2010) also estimates the ARRA’s economic impact using a VAR approach that compares forecasted post-
ARRA outcomes (employment or GDP), based on data through 2009:Q1, to actual post-ARRA outcomes. 
6 For more details and discussion of these data on ARRA job counts, see Government Accountability Office (2009) 
and CBO (2011).  7 
 
effects.  However, a number of other studies also have followed a similar approach.  One is the 
paper is that by Chodorow-Reich, et al. (2011), which investigates the employment effects of the 
ARRA’s Medicaid spending, finding that such spending generated 38 job-years per million 
dollars, or about $26,000 per job.  This paper and Chodorow-Reich, et al. share in common the 
use of states’ pre-ARRA Medicaid expenditures as an instrument for ARRA spending done by 
the Health and Human Services department.  (Although, as I show later in the paper, my baseline 
empirical results are qualitatively unchanged if I exclude this instrument.)  However, this paper 
uses that instrument along with instruments for other departments’ ARRA spending in order to 
estimate the overall employment effects of ARRA spending, while Chodorow-Reich, et al. focus 
on the narrower question of the specific impact of the ARRA’s Medicaid fiscal relief fund.  
Furthermore, Chodorow-Reich, et al. rely on ARRA payments (outlays) to measure stimulus 
spending whereas this paper utilizes data on announcements and obligations of ARRA funds, 
which I argue below are likely to better reflect the funding amounts that agents anticipate.  A 
second related paper is Feyrer and Sacerdote (2011), which utilizes state and county level 
variation in ARRA outlays and employment outcomes.  Another is Conley and Dupor (2011) use 
cross-state variation in ARRA payments and obligations, instrumenting with ARRA highway 
funding and states’ reliance on sales taxes, to estimate ARRA spending’s overall employment 
effect as well as its effect in selected subsectors.  A discussion of how the empirical approaches 
and results from these latter two studies compare to this paper is provided in Section V. 
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  The next section discusses the 
empirical methodology and describes the data used in the analysis.  The baseline empirical 
results, showing the ARRA’s impact on employment as of its one-year mark, are presented and 
discussed in Section III.  Section IV considers how the employment effect varied across sectors 
and over time.  In Section V, I discuss the implications of these results and compare them with 





II.  Empirical Model and Data 
 
A.  Baseline Empirical Model 
 
  I estimate the following cross-state instrumental variables regression: 
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  ,, 0 iT i L L   is the change in employment, scaled by 2009 population, from the initial period 
when the stimulus act was passed (t = 0) to some later period (t = T).   , iT S  is cumulative ARRA 
spending per capita in state i as of period T.   ,0 i X  is a vector of control variables (“included” 
instruments).   ,0 i Z  is a vector of (“excluded”) instruments. 
I will refer to β as the fiscal jobs multiplier.  Formally, β represents the marginal effect of 
per capita stimulus spending on employment change from period 0 to T: 
 






iT i i iT i
iT iT i
L L POP LL





                  
(2) 
where POPi,0 is state population in 2009, and 
$
, iT S  is the level of cumulative stimulus spending in 
the state (
$
,, , 0 * iT iT i SS P O P  ).  The reciprocal of β represents the stimulus cost per job created or 
saved. 
 
B.  Dependent Variable and Controls 
 
Except when otherwise noted, monthly state employment is measured using the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics’ (BLS) Current Employment Statistics (CES) payroll survey data on seasonally-
adjusted employment in the total nonfarm sector.
7 
                                                 
7 Preliminary CES data, which come out approximately two months after the month in question, are based on a 
payroll survey of about 400,000 business establishments and some model-based adjustments for establishment entry 
and exit.  These data are revised annually to incorporate information on state employment levels from state UI 9 
 
I include five control variables in each regression.  These control variables are included 
because they are likely to be both good predictors of economic outcomes over the post-ARRA 
period and could be correlated with the instruments used to predict ARRA spending.  Following 
Blanchard and Katz’s (1992) empirical model of state employment growth, I control for lagged 
employment growth and the initial level of employment.  Specifically, I include the change in 
employment per capita from the start of the recession (Dec. 2007) to when the ARRA was 
enacted (Feb. 2009) and the initial level of employment per capita as of February 2009. 
One unique feature of the 2007-2009 recession was the rapid run-up in house prices 
preceding the recession followed by a sharp correction.  The magnitude of the run-up and 
subsequent correction varied considerably across states and one might be concerned that the 
house price run-up could be correlated with one or more of the formula factors used as 
instruments.  For this reason, I control for the percentage change in the state’s house prices from 
2003 to 2007 using the state-level House Price Index from the Federal Housing Finance Agency 
(FHFA). 
The last two controls account for specific features of the ARRA.  The first is the change, 
from 2005 to 2006, in a three-year trailing average of personal income per capita.  This variable 
is included because it directly enters the formula determining the state allocations of ARRA 
“Fiscal Relief” funds, which come from the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) 
and were meant to help states pay Medicaid expenses.
8  The last control is estimated ARRA tax 
benefits received by state residents.  This variable is the sum of estimated tax benefits from the 
ARRA’s “Making Work Pay” (MWP) payroll tax cut and its increase of the income thresholds at 
which the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) becomes binding.  Following the Center for Budget 
and Policy Priorities (CBPP), the MWP benefits are estimated by taking each state's share of the 
national number of wage/salary earners making less than $100,000 for single filers and less than 
                                                                                                                                                             
records and updated seasonal adjustment factors.  As of the time of this writing, the last benchmark revision was 
done in March 2011, revising state employment counts for months from October 2009 through September 2010.  
Thus, the employment data used in this paper through September 2010 incorporate the benchmark revisions and are 
unlikely to be substantially revised in the future.  However, employment data for October 2010 through March 2011 
are preliminary and so the results presented herein for these months should be considered tentative. 
8 The hold-harmless component of the ARRA’s Medicaid funds calls for states whose FY2009 FMAP (an inverse 
function of mean personal income per capita from 2004-2006) is greater than FY2008 FMAP (an inverse function of 
personal income per capita from 2003-2005) to receive Medicaid funds based on FY2008 FMAP (plus other 
adjustments to this percentage specified in the ARRA).  So the hold-harmless component of a state’s ARRA 
Medicaid funds is increasing in FY2009 FMAP – FY2008 FMAP, which in turn is a function of the change in the 
three-year moving average of personal income per capita lagged three years. 10 
 
$200,000 for joint filers (roughly the levels above which the MWP benefit phases out), as of 
2006, and multiplying by the total cost of MWP tax cuts ($116.2b over 10 yrs, according to CEA 
2010).  Similarly, using state-level data from the Tax Policy Center on each state’s share of 
national AMT income, as of 2007, I estimate AMT benefits by multiplying that share by the total 
cost of the AMT adjustment ($69.8b, according to CEA 2010).   
I also report results below using state population as an additional control variable.  This 
variable turns out to be statistically insignificant and has virtually no effect on the estimated 
stimulus impact and hence is not included in the baseline specification. 
 
C.  Stimulus Spending Measures 
 
The data on ARRA spending by state come from the Recovery.gov website.  The website 
reports three different spending measures:  (1) funding announcements, (2) funding obligations, 
and (3) final payments (outlays).
9  Announcements are reported in periodic Funding Notification 
Reports, while obligations and payments are reported in weekly Financial and Activity Reports.  
Recovery.gov provides both current and past Financial and Activity Reports, allowing one to 
construct cumulative-to-date measures of obligations and payments for each month from April 
2009 onward.  Unfortunately, the website does not provide archived Funding Notification 
Reports, making it impossible to compile data on announcements over time from the information 
currently provided on the website.  However, for this paper I began routinely downloading the 
Funding Notification Reports starting in August 2009 and hence am able to measure ARRA 
funding announcements from August 2009 onward. 
For all of the analyses in this paper, I exclude spending done by the Department of Labor 
(DOL), which primarily is funds sent to state governments to pay for extended and expanded 
unemployment insurance (UI) benefits, for two reasons.  First, announcements of DOL funding 
are not reported by state on Recovery.gov.  Second, and most importantly, this type of spending 
in a given state is driven almost entirely by the change in the state’s unemployment rate.  There 
is virtually no source of exogenous variation to use as an instrument for this variable.  The 
                                                 
9 Recovery.gov provides both recipient-reported data and agency-reported data.  Because the recipient-reported data 
only cover a little over half of all ARRA spending, I use the agency-reported data, which covers all ARRA 
spending.  It should be noted that for each measure of spending, not all funds are reported separately by state.  As of 
the end of 2010, 18% of announcements, 12% of obligations, and 12% of payments were not separated by state.  For 
the remainder of the paper, I will use and discuss only the state-allocated data. 11 
 
numbers reported in the remainder of the paper reflect non-DOL ARRA spending only.  (DOL 
spending accounted for 14% ($66.5 billion) of total obligations through March 2011.) 
How do these three measures of spending differ conceptually?  Figure 1 provides a 
schematic that depicts how these three measures are related in terms of the timing of spending. 
 
Figure 1. Flow of ARRA Spending 
Funds announced as available to applicants,
conditional on satisfying requirements
Unannounced funds
Funds paid out to recipients
Funds obligated to specific recipients
Funds authorized to a given federal agency by ARRA legislation
 
 
The ARRA provided additional budget authority to federal agencies to obligate funds 
above the levels provided in the previously enacted fiscal year 2009 budget.  The legislation also 
specified formulas or mechanisms for agencies should allocate those funds to recipients.  Many 
of these formulas are simply the pre-existing formulas used by the agency to allocate non-ARRA 
funds; in essence, the ARRA just stepped up the funding amounts without altering the allocation 
mechanism.  Based on that authorization, agencies subsequently announce how much funding is 
available for eligible recipients in each state, though a small portion of authorized funds are 
never announced.
10  Whether they are announced or not, authorized funds are eventually 
awarded, or “obligated,” to recipients.  For example, the Department of Transportation (DOT) 
might award a contract to a construction firm or municipal agency at which point the DOT is 
said to have obligated those funds to that recipient.  Finally, when recipients satisfy the terms of 
their contracts, the agency actually pays out the funds.   
Based on CBO estimates, by the end of 2010 nearly 90% of the expected 10-year ARRA 
spending total had been obligated and 65% had been paid out.  The progression of spending can 
be seen in Figure 2, which shows state-allocated ARRA funding announcements, obligations, 
                                                 
10 The glossary entry for “Funds Announced by an Agency” on recovery.gov states:  “Not all available funds are 
announced publicly. For example, the funds going to a project started prior to the Recovery Act that are commingled 
with the project’s Recovery funds will not be announced publicly before being made available to a recipient.”   12 
 
and payments from April 2009 through March 2011.
11  By the end of this period, 
announcements, obligations, and payments were $282.6 billion, $298.5 billion, and $200.6 
billion, respectively. 
The ARRA spending (excluding DOL spending) is spread over dozens of separate federal 
agencies, though three agencies in particular account for the bulk of it.  The disaggregation 
across major agencies is shown in Table 1.  Through March 2011, the Departments of Education 
(ED), Health and Human Services (HHS), and Transportation (DOT) are responsible for 64% of 
the spending announcements, 79% of obligations, and 85% of payments.  For this reason, while I 
include all non-DOL stimulus spending in the analysis, my instrumental variables approach to 
identifying the exogenous component of stimulus spending will focus on the formula factors that 
go into the allocations of ED, HHS, and DOT spending. 
Although I report regression results for all three measures of spending, it is worth 
discussing the relative merits of each as a measure of fiscal stimulus. The advantage of 
announcements and obligations relative to payments is that the former two measures are likely to 
lead (affect) employment and other economic activity, whereas payments are likely to lag 
activity.  For instance, private contractors are most likely to make job hiring or retention 
decisions when they begin a project, which will occur after they have been awarded a contract.  
If the contract is awarded directly by a federal agency, the timing of the contract award will be 
reflected in the timing of the obligations data.  If the contract is awarded by a state or local 
government agency, which received funding from the ARRA, the contract award will occur at 
some point after the announcement and obligation of those funds to the state or local agency.      
A payment will not occur until the contract is completed, and possibly even later if there are 
bureaucratic delays in disbursements.   
Announcements generally lead obligations by several months.  For job creation/retention 
of private contractors funded directly by federal agencies, obligations are likely the most relevant 
measure because they reflect contract awards to a specific contractor.  For job creation/retention 
decisions by state and local governments or decisions by contractors funded by state or local 
                                                 
11 Note that total announcements are observed only for August 2009 onward.  Recovery.gov does not provide 
archived Funding Notifications (the source of announcements data) and Aug. 2009 was the first month in which I 
began regularly downloading the Funding Notification reports.  For some agencies, however, announcements are 
known for earlier months because their Aug. 2009 Funding Notifications indicated that the reported level of 
announced funds is “as of” a specified earlier month.  The earlier “as of” month is reflected in the announcements-
by-agency levels shown in Figure 4. 13 
 
government agencies, announcements may be the most relevant measure since the timing of 
announcements reflect when a state or local government first learns that it is eligible to receive 
the funds, and it can then act upon that information in its budgeting and personnel decisions.
12  
Thus, in terms of obligations versus announcements, obligations have the advantage of reflecting 
only guaranteed funding to specified recipients (as opposed to notification of funding eligibility) 
and, at least for private projects funded directly by federal agencies, may be timed closer to the 
start of project when hiring is most likely to occur.  From a more general theoretical perspective, 
however, announcements have the advantage of more closely reflecting the timing of agents’ 
expectations about future stimulus spending in their state.  Recent papers by Ramey (2011), 
Leeper, et al. (2010), and Mertens and Ravn (2010) have demonstrated the empirical importance 
of measuring the timing of initial announcements and/or anticipation of government spending 
shocks.  For this reason, I treat announcements as the preferred measure of stimulus spending 
throughout the paper. 
 
D.  Instruments 
 
As mentioned earlier, the stimulus variable,  , iT S , may well be endogenous (λ ≠ 0).  There 
are two potential sources of endogeneity.  First, some of the components of  , iT S  are explicitly 
functions of current economic conditions.  For example, consider the formula determining the 
state allocation of spending from the Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) “Fiscal 
Relief Fund,” which is meant to help state governments pay for Medicaid expenses.  Each state’s 
per capita receipts from this Fund depend on three factors:  (1) the current federal Medicaid share 
(which is a function of pre-ARRA income per capita), (2) the “hold-harmless” component (a 
function of 2006-2007 growth in a three-year moving average of state income per capita, which I 
control for in the regressions), and (3) the change in the unemployment rate from the beginning 
of the recession through February 2009.  These factors determining ARRA Fiscal Relief funds 
may also be correlated with post-stimulus economic conditions – for example, states with a rapid 
pre-stimulus increase in the unemployment rate may be likely to rebound more quickly than 
other states because the rapid increase might suggest those states tend to enter and exit recessions 
                                                 
12 Note that state and local governments generally are able to avoid any temporary cash flow shortage through short-
term borrowing (e.g., issuing revenue anticipation notes or warrants). 14 
 
earlier than others.  However, note that if these factors are controlled for directly in  i X , then this 
source of endogeneity should be eliminated. 
A second potential source of endogeneity, especially for obligations and payments, is that 
the level and timing of ARRA spending going to any given state is partly a function of how 
successful the state government is at soliciting funds from federal agencies.  Most of the state 
allocation of funding announcements is exogenously determined by formulas, but much of 
obligations and payments are allocated at the discretion of the federal agencies as they review 
whether states have satisfied so-called “maintenance of effort” (MOE) requirements and what the 
states’ plans are for how they intend to spend the money.  States with unfavorable MOE’s or 
spending plans may receive funding later or not at all (e.g., DOT funds have a “use it or lose it” 
requirement
13).  States that are more successful in soliciting funds and starting projects may also 
be better-run state governments, and better-run states may be more likely to have positive 
outcomes regardless of the stimulus funds.  One can address this source of endogeneity via 
instrumental variables.  
  I instrument for actual ARRA spending (measured by announcements, obligations, or 
payments) by state,  , iT S , using instruments based on the formulary allocation factors.  The vast 
majority of ARRA spending was allocated to states according to statutory formulas, some of 
which were unique to the ARRA and some of which were pre-existing formulas already used for 
non-ARRA funds.  In particular, I construct three instruments based on the formulas used by the 
three federal agencies responsible for the bulk of ARRA spending:  the Departments of 
Transportation (DOT), Education (ED), and Health and Human Services (HHS).
14 
 
1.  Department of Transportation Instrument 
  Around three-quarters of the DOT’s $40 billion of ARRA funding was allotted to the 
Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), which funds construction and repair of highways and 
bridges.  The ARRA specified that 50% of these FHWA funds be allocated to states based on the 




14 In previous drafts of this paper, I also reported results using as instruments predicted 10-year ARRA cost 
estimates published by the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) and the Center for American Progress (CAP) at the time the 
stimulus bill was enacted.  The estimated ARRA jobs multipliers based on those instruments are very similar to 
those using the formula factors as instruments and are available upon request. 15 
 
pre-existing allocation formula used by the FHWA’s Surface Transportation Program (STP).  
With some exceptions, this formula is simply a weighted average of three factors, each measured 
with a three-year lag:  the state’s lane-miles of federal-aid highways, its estimated vehicle miles 
traveled on federal-aid highways, and its estimated payments (primarily from a motor fuels 
excise tax) into the federal highway trust fund.  Thus, this portion of the DOT’s ARRA funds in 
2009 were allocated to states roughly in proportion to the values of these three factors in 2006.  
The other 50% was set to be allocated in exactly the same proportion as FHWA used for non-
ARRA funds (obligation limitations) in 2008, of which the STP program is a major component.  
Thus, those STP program formula factors help explain a large share of the FHWA’s, and hence 
DOT’s, ARRA spending by state.  Both the three-year lag and the likely weak association 
between such factors and a state’s current economic conditions suggest an instrument 
constructed from these factors should satisfy the exclusion restriction of the IV estimator.  I 
construct such an instrument by taking the fitted value from regressing the DOT’s ARRA 
obligations in 2009 on total lane miles of federal-aid highways in 2006, total vehicle miles 
traveled on federal-aid highways in 2006, estimated tax payments attributable to highway users 
paid into the federal highway trust fund in 2006, and FHWA obligation limitations in 2008. 
 
2.  Department of Education Instrument 
Over half of the ED’s ARRA spending comes from the $54 billion State Fiscal 
Stabilization Fund (SFSF) set up by the legislation.  The ARRA specified that 61% of the fund 
would be allocated to states in proportion to their school-aged (5-24 years old) population and 
the other 39% would be allocated in proportion to total population.  This implies that the per 
capita stimulus that any given state can be expected to receive over the life of the ARRA is a 
simple linear function of the state’s school-aged population share, making this share a natural 
instrument for actual per capita ARRA education spending received by a state.
15  The youth 
population share will satisfy the exclusion restriction as long as states’ post-ARRA employment 
                                                 
15 The SFSF funding allocated to state i, Si, is determined according to the formula, 
     0.61 0.39 ii i SS y y p p  , where  i y  denotes school-aged population,  i p  denotes total population, and 
bars above variables indicate national totals.  A state’s per capita SFSF authorized funding is then, 
   0.39 0.61 i ii i S pS pS y y p   . 16 
 
growth, conditional on pre-ARRA employment trends and the other controls, is not 
systematically related to states’ youth population share. 
 
3.  Health and Human Services Instrument 
  The ARRA also set up an $87 billion State Fiscal Relief Fund meant to help states pay 
their Medicaid expenses.  The formula for allocating these funds to states was described above.  
Among other components, the ARRA temporarily increased the state-specific percentages of 
Medicaid expenditures reimbursed by HHS by 6.2 percentage points for all states.  This means 
that states that, prior to the ARRA, had higher Medicaid expenditures per capita (either because 
of having more low-income families per capita or because they have more generous Medicaid 
programs) will tend to receive more ARRA HHS funds per capita.  Therefore, pre-ARRA state 
Medicaid expenditures should be a good predictor of ARRA HHS funds.  And because pre-
ARRA state Medicaid expenditures are based on conditions (generosity of the state’s Medicaid 
program and income per capita from earlier years) prior to the ARRA, they should be orthogonal 
to post-ARRA economic conditions, making them suitable instruments for realized ARRA health 
spending.  Chodorow-Reich, et al. (2011) use this instrument as well in their study of the 
economic impact of the State Fiscal Relief Fund. 
 
III.  Baseline Results 
 
A.  A Simple Illustrative Comparison of High and Low Stimulus States 
 
Before estimating the baseline empirical model described above, it is useful to consider 
the results of a simple exercise that illustrates the key sources of variation used to identify that 
baseline model.
16  First, I separate states into quintiles based on predicted ARRA spending – that 
is, the fitted values from regressing ARRA spending on the three instruments described above.  I 
then compare employment over time for the top quintile to that of the bottom quintile.  Table 2 
shows the full ranking of states by predicted ARRA announcements.  The ranking is similar if 
                                                 
16 A similar exercise was done in Mian and Sufi’s (2010) study of the effect of the Cash for Clunkers program on 
auto purchases. 17 
 
done according to obligations or payments.  The table also shows each state’s values for actual 
announcements and each of the three instruments.   
The results of the exercise are shown in Figure 3, which compares median employment 
across the 10 states in the top quintile of predicted stimulus to that of the 10 states in the bottom 
quintile.  Each state’s employment is scaled by its average 2008 value to put all states on similar 
scales.  Employment was falling sharply for both sets of states prior to the ARRA’s enactment in 
February 2009 (indicated by the vertical line), though it had been falling for longer for the 
bottom quintile.  Employment began to stabilize for the high predicted-stimulus states – that is, 
those whose pre-ARRA formula factors (instruments) made them more likely to receive high 
levels of ARRA spending – around mid-2009, while employment for the low predicted-stimulus 
states continued to fall until early 2010.  As a result, what was a small gap between the high and 
low stimulus states when the ARRA was enacted widened substantially in subsequent months.  
In particular, a large gap is evident by February 2010, one year after the Act was passed. 
This simple comparison illustrates the basic idea of the more comprehensive empirical 
model estimated below, namely, comparing employment outcomes across states differentiated by 
how much ARRA spending they were predicted to receive based on pre-ARRA formula factors.  
However, the full empirical model will do this across all 50 states and will control for a number 
of other factors, such as the different trends in employment leading up to the ARRA as is evident 
in Figure 3. 
 
B.  Estimates of the Baseline Model 
 
Summary statistics for the dependent variables, independent variables, and instruments 
used in the analysis are shown in Table 3.  Table 4 provides the first-stage results for the IV 
estimation.
17  Column (1) shows the results when announcements are used as the measure of 
stimulus; columns (2) and (3) give the results when obligations and payments, respectively, are 
used.  Each of the three instruments, which are based on pre-ARRA factors, is found to be 
positively related to the subsequent allocation of ARRA spending.  The DOT and HHS 
instruments are statistically significant for predicting all three measures of spending.  The ED 
                                                 
17 The stimulus variables are expressed here in thousands instead of millions to ease display of the coefficient 
values.  18 
 
instrument, youth population share, is statistically significant for predicting payments but not for 
announcements or obligations, which is likely due to the positive collinearity between ED and 
the other two instruments. 
  The second-stage IV results along with OLS results for the baseline model (equations 
(1a) and (1b)) are shown in Table 5.  Each column represents a separate regression.  The 
dependent variable in each regression is the change in total nonfarm employment per capita 
(using 2009 population).  The initial period (t = 0) for these regressions is February 2009, the 
month in which the ARRA was enacted.  For the purposes of these baseline results, I choose the 
end period (t = T) to be February 2010.  This choice is basically arbitrary – below I present the 
fiscal jobs multiplier estimates for other end-months – though February 2010 is of particular 
interest given that many studies of the short-run fiscal multiplier focus on the multiplier one year 
after the initial government spending shock.  Bold coefficients are statistically significant at the 
10% level or below.  In addition to the ARRA spending variables, the explanatory variables 
include the 2005 to 2006 change in a three-year average of real personal income per capita (a 
factor in the allocation of HHS funds), an estimate of the per capita ARRA tax benefits going to 
the state, the change in employment from December 2007 to February 2009 (a measure of the 
pre-ARRA employment trend in the state), the initial level of the employment per capita in 
February 2009, and the percentage change in the state’s House Price Index from 2003 through 
2007 (a measure of the pre-recession run-up in house prices).  The stimulus variables are 
measured in millions of dollars per capita. 
The first two columns of Table 5 show the results with stimulus measured by cumulative 
announcements through February 2010.  The OLS estimate of the jobs multiplier, β, is 4.3, with 
a standard error of 2.4.  As shown in equation (2), this number can be interpreted as saying that 
each $1 million of ARRA announced funds received by a state is associated with 4.3 jobs created 
or saved in that state (between February 2009 and February 2010).  The IV estimate is 8.1 (s.e. = 
3.5).  This estimate implies that the ARRA spending’s cost per job created or saved at its one-
year mark was approximately $123,000.  Using cumulative obligations as the stimulus measure, 
the OLS estimate is 6.7 (s.e. = 3.6) and the IV estimate is 11.7 (s.e. = 4.1).  This IV estimate 
implies a cost per job of about $85,000.  For payments, using either OLS and IV, the estimated 
multiplier is much less precisely estimated than for announcements or obligations, but it is still 
statistically significant.  The OLS estimate is 13.0 and the IV estimate is 22.8.  The latter implies 19 
 
a cost per job of about $44,000.  The fact that in every case the OLS estimate is lower than the 
IV estimate suggests that stimulus spending may have been endogenously directed 
disproportionately toward states experiencing worse economic outcomes.  Yet, it should also be 
pointed out that even the OLS estimates are found to be positive and statistically significant.  
The first-stage F statistics are shown at the bottom of the table.  Stock and Yogo (2004) 
provide critical values of these statistics below which indicate possible weak instrument bias.  At 
conventional significance levels, they list a critical value of 12.83 for the case of one endogenous 
variable and three instruments.  The first-stage statistics for the obligations and payments 
regressions are well above that critical value.  The statistic for the announcements regressions, 
however, is slightly below the critical value, suggesting the coefficient on announcements may 
be biased downward.  Also shown are the p-values corresponding to the Hansen (1982) J-test of 
overidentifying restrictions.  The p-values in all cases are well above conventional significance 
levels. 
It is also worth mentioning the estimated coefficients on the control variables.  I find that 
the 2005-2006 change in the three-year average of personal income is negatively and 
significantly associated with employment change over February 2009 to February 2010.  This 
may reflect the fact that states that grew faster during the mid-2000s boom tended to experience 
larger economic declines during the 2007-2009 recession and its aftermath.  Estimated ARRA 
tax benefits are found to have had a positive effect on employment; the effect is statistically 
significant when stimulus spending is measured by announcements or obligations but not when it 
is measured by payments.
18  The pre-ARRA trend (from December 2007 to February 2009) in 
employment change (per capita) is positively associated with the post-ARRA employment 
change; the coefficient is statistically significant in all cases.  This result likely reflects positive 
momentum or inertia in employment growth during this period.  Lastly, I find that the initial 
level of employment in February 2009 is negatively associated with post-February 2009 
employment change, suggesting some conditional convergence across states in terms of 
employment-population ratios. 
Returning to the coefficients on the stimulus measures, there are clear differences in the 
magnitudes of the estimated jobs multiplier across the three stimulus measures.  In particular, the 
                                                 
18 The coefficient on estimated tax benefits should be interpreted with caution.  This variable is an estimated of the 
expected tax benefits the state will receive over the entire 10-year horizon of the ARRA rather than actual tax 
benefits from February 2009 to February 2010, which is unobserved. 20 
 
multiplier based on payments – which is the typical measure of government spending in prior 
empirical work – is much higher than that based on announcements or obligations.  How should 
these differences be interpreted?  One interpretation is that announcements, obligations, and 
payments are just three alternative measures of a latent variable representing the true expected 
amount of stimulus received by each state from the ARRA.  Announcements and obligations 
have much larger mean values (as shown in Table 3) than payments but all three measures are 
very highly correlated.  Thus, to a first approximation, one can think of payments as simply 
proportional to obligations or announcements:  payments(i,t) = α*obligations(i,t), where α <1.  If 
this were literally true, then the estimated ARRA spending effect based on payments would 
simply be α*β , where β is the estimated multiplier based on obligations.  This appears to be 
roughly true empirically:  the ratio of the average level of payments per capita to the average 
level of obligations per capita, as of Feb. 2010, is 0.54 (see Table 2).  The ratio of their 
coefficients in Table 3 is 0.49. 
As discussed in Section II.C, announcements and obligations are more likely to reflect 
the magnitude of the true latent stimulus variable because they should lead the economic activity 
generated by the stimulus, whereas payments are likely to be a lagging indicator of 
announcements and obligations.  For this reason, the coefficient on payments in these type of 
regressions is likely biased upward because it is reflecting the true effect stemming from 
announcements or obligations which won’t be recorded in payments until several months later.   
 
C.  Robustness 
 
In Table 6, I evaluate the robustness of the baseline results.  First, I consider whether the 
results are sensitive to the presence or absence of the control variables included in the baseline 
specification.  The second row of the table shows the IV coefficients on the stimulus variables 
when controls are omitted.  The estimated effect of ARRA spending on employment is positive 
and significant regardless of whether the controls are included or not. The coefficient on 
announcements is quite similar to the baseline case.  For obligations and payments, the 
coefficient without controls is even larger.   21 
 
A possible concern one might have regarding the baseline results is that the economies of 
less populous states have tended to perform better during the 2007-2009 recession and 
subsequent recovery than other states.  Even though it is difficult to think of why population 
would directly cause better economic outcomes, there is nonetheless concern that population 
may be correlated with one or more of the instruments, invalidating the instruments.  Thus, as a 
robustness check, I report results in third row for regressions in which state population is added 
as an additional control variable along with the five included in the baseline specification.  The 
estimated multipliers are similar or a bit higher than those from the baseline model. 
I next perform two robustness checks related to potential measurement error in the CES 
employment data.  The first one addresses the concern that some states, especially less populous 
states, may have more measurement error in employment than others and should be given less 
weight in the regressions.  The fourth row of the table presents results where states are weighted 
by the inverse of their sampling error variance from the CES payroll survey, as reported by the 
BLS. This weighting will also mitigate any undue influence of outlier states in terms of ARRA 
spending (such as Alaska, North Dakota, and Wyoming) because these sampling error variances 
are highly negatively correlated with state population.   One can see that the multipliers obtained 
in the weighted regressions are generally quite similar to those obtained without weighting. 
In the fifth row, I consider an alternative measure of state employment produced by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).  The Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW), 
previously known as the ES-202 series, is based on a census of state administrative (UI) records 
and thus has minimal measurement error.  The estimated jobs multipliers based on QCEW data 
are also positive and statistically significant, though the announcements coefficient is somewhat 
smaller than the baseline case while the coefficients on obligations and payments are somewhat 
larger.  Overall, there’s little indication the CES-based results are likely to be systematically 
biased due to measurement error. 
I then assess whether the baseline results are unduly influenced by outliers.  As is 
apparent in Table 2 and Figure 4, five sparsely populated Western states – Montana, South 
Dakota, North Dakota, Alaska, and Wyoming – have notably higher values of both actual and 
predicted stimulus spending than other states.  The sixth row of Table 6 shows the estimated 
jobs multipliers if one excludes these states from the sample.  The multipliers are actually higher, 
especially for announcements, when one excludes these outliers.  22 
 
Next, I investigate whether the baseline results are driven by one particular instrument.  
Rows 7-9 of Table 6 show how the IV coefficients change if one drops any single instrument.  
No single one of the instruments appears to be critical to obtaining the baseline results.  The only 
exception is that the coefficient on predicted payments is insignificant (with a large point 
estimate and standard error) when the HHS instrument is excluded.   
In rows 10-12, I consider alternative choices for the initial, or pre-treatment, period.  If 
the passage, size, and geographic distribution of the ARRA was substantially anticipated prior to 
February 2009, then the Act may have had an economic impact prior to passage.  In particular, 
such anticipation would imply that a state’s February 2009 employment level is an inaccurate 
measure of “pre-stimulus” employment, and that using February as the initial month may 
underestimate the impact of the stimulus.  Media reports and surveys from the time suggest that, 
while many agents likely anticipated a large fiscal stimulus package at least one or two months 
prior to the ARRA’s enactment in February 2009, how those funds would be allocated across 
states was not widely anticipated prior to February.  For example, even in the first few weeks 
after the ARRA’s enactment, state officials complained that they had little notion of the amount 
and composition of ARRA funds they would be receiving.
19  Nonetheless, I report here how the 
baseline results differ if one uses November 2008, December 2008 or January 2009 as the pre-
treatment month in defining the pre-treatment to post-treatment employment change (as well as 
in defining the pre-stimulus employment level and trend control variables).  In all cases, 
February 2010 is still the end month.  Note that while employment in months prior to February 
2009 are more likely to be unaffected by ARRA anticipation, using an earlier month also 
introduces more noise into the measurement of post-ARRA employment change. 
The results are relatively insensitive to the exact month used as the pre-treatment period, 
though the standard errors are higher when an earlier month is used, consistent with the notion 
that using earlier initial months adds measurement error to the dependent variable.  Overall, there 
is some indication from these results that treating February 2009 as the initial month may 
understate the true impact of the ARRA spending, but the magnitude of any understatement 
appears to be relatively small. 
 
                                                 
19 The following quote from the spokesperson for the Governor of North Carolina, reported in the March 4, 2009 
Wall Street Journal is a case in point:  “All of the states are in the same boat -- none of us have a very clear picture 
yet about the details of the package.” 23 
 
 
IV.  Extensions and A Falsification Test 
 
A.  Employment Effects by Sector 
 
I turn now to two interesting extensions of the baseline results.  First, I estimate the 
employment effects of ARRA spending on selected subsectors.   Given large portions of the 
stimulus package were targeted at aid for state and local governments, infrastructure, high-tech 
and green manufacturing, healthcare, and education, I look at the sectors of state and local 
government, construction, manufacturing, and private-sector education and health services.
20  
Table 7 displays the estimated jobs multiplier for each of these subsectors as well as for the total 
nonfarm sector and the private nonfarm sector.  (Note that these categories are not mutually 
exclusive; construction, manufacturing, and education and health services are three selected 
subsectors within the private nonfarm sector.)  The regressions use the same set of instruments 
and include the same control variables as the regressions in Table 5, except that the initial level 
and pre-ARRA trend in employment per capita are defined in terms of the same subsector as the 
dependent variable.  Results using announcements as the stimulus spending measure are shown 
in the top row; the second and third rows show the results based on obligations and payments, 
respectively.  Standard errors are shown in parentheses, followed by the first-stage F-statistic in 
italics. 
The jobs multiplier for the private nonfarm sector is estimated to be 4.0 for 
announcements, 9.7 for obligations, and 21.8 for payments.
21  The estimates are statistically 
significant for obligations and payments, but not for announcements.  For the state and local 
government sector, the IV estimated jobs multiplier is positive and significant for all three 
measures of spending.  The multiplier is found to be 3.0, 2.7, and 5.3 for announcements, 
obligations, and payments, respectively.  The estimated jobs multiplier also is positive and 
significant for all measures of spending for the Construction and Manufacturing sectors.  For the 
                                                 
20 Unfortunately, employment data is not available for public-sector education and health services. 
21 Note that these jobs multipliers by subsector are expected to be smaller than the total nonfarm sector as long as the 
excluded subsectors have non-negative multipliers.  Hence, there magnitudes are not directly comparable.  In 
Section VI.A, the magnitudes of the sector-specific multipliers will be evaluated as percentages relative to each 
sector’s pre-ARRA level of employment, making them comparable across sectors. 24 
 
Education and Health sector, the multiplier is estimated to be positive and significant based on 
either obligation or payments, but not based on announcements. 
 
B.  Alternative End Dates 
 
The cross-sectional analysis described above smoothes over any variation among states in 
the intertemporal pattern of stimulus spending and outcomes between the ARRA’s enactment 
and the end of the sample period.  For example, for a given level of cumulative spending to date, 
one state may have received most of the spending early in the sample period whereas another 
may have received most of the spending later in the period.  This timing variation may contain 
useful information, but it is likely to be endogenous for two reasons.  First, as mentioned earlier, 
states with well-run governments may fulfill the requirements necessary to receive certain 
ARRA funds sooner than other states and having a well-run government may itself lead to better 
economic outcomes.  Second, some components of the ARRA will be doled out to any given 
state in response to negative economic shocks as they hit the state, so again the timing of the 
stimulus will be endogenous with respect to the timing of economic outcomes.  Unfortunately, 
while I arguably have strong and valid instruments for cumulative stimulus spending up to any 
particular post-ARRA-enactment date, I have no additional instruments that predict the flow of 
spending (i.e., the first-difference of cumulative spending) by month.  Absent some exogenous 
determinant of the monthly flow of ARRA spending, the exogenous component of this monthly 
flow is unidentified.  This rules out using a dynamic panel model to estimate a distributed lag 
structure or impulse response function for stimulus spending. 
However, one can still assess how the employment effects of cumulative past ARRA 
spending varied over time – that is, over alternative sample end dates.  How the estimated 
employment effect varies with the sample end date potentially reflects both the timing of 
stimulus spending up to the end date (i.e., did the bulk of spending occur toward the beginning of 
the sample or closer to the end date?) and the impulse response function for the spending.   
Again, it is not possible to disentangle the two without very strong exogeneity assumptions. 
The panels in  Figure 5 plot the estimated employment effect of ARRA spending for 
alternative end months, from as early as May 2009 to as late as March 2011.  That is, each data 
point in the plots is the IV coefficient on ARRA spending from a separate regression of the 25 
 
baseline model, where the only difference across regressions is the end-month used to define the 
dependent variable, which is the change in employment from February 2009 to the end-month.  
The earliest month of data for announcements is August 2009.  Panels A, B, and C show the 
results for announcements, obligations, and payments, respectively.  In each panel, the solid line 
shows the estimated IV coefficient on cumulative ARRA spending (as of each month).  The 
dashed lines indicate the 90% confidence interval.  The dotted lines show the path of observed 
ARRA spending (in billions of dollars, indicated on the right axis) according to announcements, 
obligations, or payments.  
Based on announcements, the estimated employment effect was positive and significant 
throughout the sample period (August 2009 to March 2011).  There was somewhat of a decline 
in the magnitude of the multiplier around May 2010, but overall the employment impact grew 
over the sample period, rising from about 7 to about 12.
22  The coefficient patterns using 
obligations and payments are similar for the matching time period (August 2009 to March 2011), 
and provide additional evidence for earlier months going back to May 2009.  Based on 
obligations, ARRA spending did not begin to have a statistically significant impact on total 
nonfarm employment until July 2009.  Based on payments, the confidence interval around the 
estimated employment effect is very large in the early months of the sample; the employment 
effect becomes statistically significant starting with the end month of October 2009 and remains 
significant through the end of the sample.  
 
 
C.  A Falsification Test 
 
To assess whether the ARRA employment effects estimated in this paper are unique to 
the post-ARRA-enactment period, and therefore less likely to be spurious, I perform a 
falsification test by running the following two-step estimation.  In step 1, I estimate the baseline 
regression but without stimulus spending: 
                                                 
22 Earlier drafts of this paper, based on real-time preliminary CES employment data from September 2009 onward 
(unlike this draft which uses the revised final CES data through September 2010 and preliminary data thereafter), 
showed a steep and sustained drop-off in the employment effects of ARRA spending starting around April of 2010.  
This drop-off goes away when one uses the revised data, suggesting the earlier result was likely an artifact of 
measurement error in the real-time data. 26 
 
 ,, 0 , 0 , iT i T i T iT LL       X                        (4) 
where  ,0 i X  is the same vector of pre-ARRA control variables as used in the baseline IV 
regressions.  I estimate this model (by OLS) separately for each month from March 2008 through 
March 2011.  One can think of this regression as providing a forecast (or backcast for months 
prior to February 2009) of employment in month T relative to February 2009.   
In step 2, I regress the residuals from step 1 on a linear combination of the three 
instruments used in the baseline IV regressions.  The coefficients on the instruments in this linear 
combination are simply their coefficients from the first-stage of the baseline IV regression as of 
February 2010 (i.e., those shown in Table 4).
23  In other words, this linear combination of 
instruments is simply predicted ARRA spending as of February 2010.  If the positive relationship 
I find in the baseline IV regressions between predicted ARRA spending and post-February 2009 
employment change is truly a causal effect, then there should be no correlation between these 
employment residuals and predicted ARRA spending prior to February 2009.  
The estimated coefficient on predicted ARRA spending from this second step regression, 
and its 90% confidence interval, are shown in Figure 6.  The estimated coefficient is near zero 
and statistically insignificant for all months up to January 2009.  Aside from the correlation in 
this last pre-ARRA month, the lack of correlation for all earlier months indicates there is no 
general, spurious correlation between employment, conditional on the control variables, and the 
instruments.  The negative and significant correlation in January 2009 could reflect some early 
anticipation effects prior to ARRA passage, as discussed in Section IV.C above.  Overall, the 
results of this falsification test bolster the case that the baseline IV coefficients, both at the one-
year mark after the ARRA’s enactment (Table 5) and over time (Figure 6), reflect the causal 
impact of ARRA spending on subsequent employment change and not a spurious correlation due 
to omitted factors.  For omitted factors to explain the baseline results, the timing of their impact 
on employment would have to coincide very closely with the timing of ARRA spending. 
 
 
                                                 
23 I use the first-stage coefficients from the obligations regression, but the results are similar if one uses the 
coefficients from the announcement or payments regressions. 27 
 
V.  Implications and Comparisons with Other Studies 
 
A.  Overall Impact of ARRA on National Employment 
 
The discussion of the results above focused on the sign and statistical significance of the 
estimated jobs multipliers.  In this section, I turn to drawing out the economic implications of the 
results.  As noted in the introduction, the jobs multipliers estimated in this paper are local 
multipliers.  That is, they reflect the average employment effect within a state of ARRA 
spending received by that state.  To extrapolate from these local effects to the national effect 
requires additional assumptions.  For instance, if mobility is greater among sub-national regions 
than among countries, the local multiplier may be a lower bound on the national multiplier.  On 
the other hand, if the government financing burden of stimulus spending falls on states 
independent of their ARRA receipts and agents are Ricardian (forward-looking), the local 
multiplier will be an upper bound on the national multiplier.  That said, it is useful to consider 
the implications of the baseline multiplier estimates under the simple case of an economy with 
myopic agents and without trade.   
In that case, one can calculate the nationwide number of jobs created or saved by ARRA 
spending implied by a given jobs multiplier estimate, by multiplying that estimate by the amount 
of ARRA spending to date.  Recall from Table 3, that the baseline IV regression for 
announcements indicated that each million dollars of ARRA announcements yielded 8.1 jobs in 
total nonfarm sector by the end of the ARRA’s first year.  The analogous multipliers based on 
obligations and payments are 11.7, and 22.8, respectively.  Announcements (excluding DOL) 
through February 2010 totaled $248 billion.  The jobs multiplier of 8.1 then implies 2.0 million 
more jobs in the economy in February 2010 than there would have been without the ARRA’s 
spending.  That number represents a 1.5% increase relative to the level of total nonfarm 
employment in February 2009.  Analogous calculations using cumulative obligations or 
payments, and their respective jobs multiplier estimates, suggest nationwide effects of 2.9 or 2.7 
million jobs, respectively.  (Obligations and payments imply similar effects because the 
obligations’ jobs multiplier is about half that of payments while cumulative obligations through 
Feb. 2010 are about double cumulative payments).   28 
 
Using the same ARRA spending total, one can calculate similar figures for the private 
nonfarm, state and local government, construction, manufacturing, and education and health 
services.  The results based on announcements are shown in Table 8 below.  The jobs multiplier 
estimate for private nonfarm implies 1.1 million jobs (1.0% relative to February 2009) created or 
saved as of February 2010.  In the S&L government sector, ARRA spending is estimated to have 
created or saved 800 thousand jobs (5.1%) through February 2010.  The construction sector is 
estimated to have created or saved 1.0 million jobs (13.2%) in the ARRA’s first year, suggesting 
the sector was one of the key beneficiaries of the ARRA.  Manufacturing is estimated to have 
increased net employment by 200 thousand jobs (1.9%) through February 2010.  Lastly, I 
estimate that the education and health sector created or saved 200 thousand jobs (0.8%) due to 
the ARRA through February 2010.   
 
Table 8.  Estimated Number of Jobs Created/Saved by ARRA Spending 
(in millions and percentages relative to Feb. 2009) 
 
February 2010
Total Nonfarm                  2.0 (1.5%) 
Private Nonfarm                  1.1 (1.0%) 
S&L Government                  0.8 (5.1%) 
Construction                  1.0 (16.4%) 
Manufacturing                  0.2 (1.9%) 
Education & Health                 0.2 (0.8%) 
 
B.  Comparison with Other Studies 
 
How do these results compare to estimates from other studies of the number of jobs 
created or saved by the ARRA?  I start with comparing it to the estimates from the most 
prominent and publicized governmental studies – the quarterly reports of the Council of 
Economic Advisors (CEA) and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) (see CEA 2011 and 
CBO 2011).  Both studies estimate the number of jobs created or saved due to total ARRA costs, 
including spending and tax cuts, by quarter.  The reported ranges are shown in Table 9 below.  
In the top row, I provide the estimated number of jobs created or saved based on my estimated 
total nonfarm jobs multiplier multiplied by ARRA spending.  The estimate here is based on 
announcements, my preferred measure of spending.  (The estimates based on obligations or 29 
 
payments are slightly higher.)  I show results for both the first quarter of 2010 and the first 
quarter of 2011, based on the jobs multiplier and spending totals as of March 2010 and March 
2011, respectively.  It should be noted, however, that the estimates for March 2011 are based on 
preliminary employment data that are subject to benchmark revisions.  (The March 2010 
estimates are based on revised, final data.)  The ranges shown indicate the ranges over the three 
estimates yielded by the three alternative spending measures (announcements, obligations, and 
payments).  As of 2010:Q1, the CEA reports a range of 2.2 to 2.6 million jobs created or saved 
(see their Table 8), whereas the CBO’s range is 1.3 to 2.8 million jobs (see their Table 1).  As of 
2011:Q1, the CEA’s range is 2.4 to 3.6 million while the CBO’s is 1.2 to 3.3 million.  My 
estimate for 2010:Q1 is roughly at the midpoint of the CBO range and is slightly below the CEA 
range.  My estimate for 2011:Q1 is slightly above the CEA range and toward the higher end of 
the CEA range.  
 
Table 9. Estimated Number of Jobs Created/Saved by ARRA 
(total nonfarm sector) 
 
First Quarter 2010 First Quarter 2011
This paper (spending only)   2.0 million  3.4 million 
Congressional Budget Office  1.3 – 2.8 million  1.2 – 3.3 million 
Council of Economic Advisors  2.2 – 2.6 million  2.4 – 3.6 million 
 
Recall that the impact estimated in this paper relates only to ARRA spending, not ARRA 
tax reductions.  If the ARRA tax reductions had a positive effect on employment (and the results 
shown in Table 5 for the coefficients on the 10-year estimated ARRA tax benefits suggest that 
they did), then the total ARRA (spending plus tax cuts) impact is even larger than indicated in 
the table.
 24  (ARRA spending is about two-thirds of CBO-estimated ARRA costs through 2019). 
There are also a number of recent academic studies aimed at analyzing the overall effect 
of ARRA spending on employment.  Similar to the approaches of the CEA and CBO, Blinder 
and Zandi (2010) use a large-scale macroeconometric model to simulate the economic effects of 
the ARRA and estimate that it increased employment (relative to the no-ARRA counterfactual) 
                                                 
24 Of course, there is much debate about whether tax cuts or spending have a larger fiscal multiplier.  For studies 
addressing this issue, see Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Mountford and Uhlig (2008), Alesina and Ardagna (2009), 
and Barro and Redlick (2009). 30 
 
by the end of the first quarter of 2010 by 2.2 million jobs (see their Table 7).  By the end of 
2010, they estimate the effect to be 2.9 million.  (They don’t provide quarterly estimates after 
2010.)  In sum, the number of jobs created or saved nationally based on the local jobs multipliers 
estimated in this paper, under the assumption of myopic agents and no cross-state spillovers, are 
generally similar to those generated by the macroeconometric modeling approach. 
Recent papers by Feyrer and Sacerdote (2011) and Conley and Dupor (2011) follow the 
cross-sectional IV methodology used in this paper.  Feyrer and Sacredote report results based 
both on county-level and state-level variation, focusing primarily on the latter.  Using data on 
ARRA payments, they estimate a cost per job created or saved, as of October 2010, of $170,000 
for the total nonfarm sector, which implies a jobs multiplier per million dollars of spending of 
about 6.  Conley and Dupor use a somewhat different measure of stimulus, dividing spending 
(measured by announcements or payments) by the pre-ARRA level of state tax revenues, based 
on the notion that the effective amount of stimulus provided by $1 of ARRA spending is greater 
the lower the state government’s pre-ARRA tax revenues (and hence the more fiscal strain the 
state is under).  They find that, through September 2010, their measure of ARRA stimulus (based 
on obligations) increased S&L government employment but decreased employment in some 
private sectors, with essentially no net impact on total nonfarm employment.
25   
The estimated ARRA effects in both Feyrer and Sacerdote and Conley and Dupor are 
much smaller than those found in this paper for the same time periods.  As seen in Figure 5, I 
estimate a multiplier on outlays (payments) of about 19 as of September or October 2010.  Even 
using announcements or obligations, I estimate a jobs multiplier for that time period that is near 
10 and statistically significant.  There are various differences between the analysis done here and 
the analyses done in those papers, including differences in instruments, how spending is 
measured, and whether or not ARRA spending on extended unemployment insurance benefits 
are included.  Another difference that could explain the divergent results is the vintage of the 
state employment data used.  The results in Feyrer and Sacredote and Conley and Dupor are 
based on preliminary, real-time payroll employment data (the initial BLS CES series) whereas 
the results presented here are based on the revised, final data.  Earlier drafts of this paper, using 
                                                 
25 The decrease is statistically significant in their preferred specification for the combined sector of health, 
education, leisure and hospitality, and business and professional services, but is not significant for the goods-
producing sector and is positive but insignificant for other service sectors (see their Table 7). 31 
 
the preliminary CES data, found a total nonfarm jobs multiplier as of October 2010 ranging from 
0 using payments to 3 using announcements. 
 
VI.  Conclusion 
 
This paper analyzed the employment impacts of fiscal stimulus spending, using state-
level data from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) enacted in February 
2009 and instrumenting for actual ARRA spending using pre-ARRA factors that went into the 
ARRA’s allocation formulas.  Cross-state IV results indicate that ARRA spending had a positive 
and statistically significant impact on total nonfarm employment at the one-year mark after the 
legislation was enacted.  It also had a positive and significant impact on employment in the 
subsectors of state and local government, construction, manufacturing and, depending on which 
measure of stimulus spending one uses, the education and health sectors.  Further analyses show 
that ARRA spending began having a statistically significant effect on total employment around 
July or August of 2009, but not before.  Moreover, there is no evidence of correlation between 
employment changes and predicted ARRA spending, conditional on controls, in months prior to 
the ARRA’s enactment.   
Based on my preferred measure of spending, announced funds, the results imply that its 
first year ARRA spending yielded about eight jobs per million dollars spent, or about $125,000 
per job.  Extrapolating from that marginal local effect to the national level, the estimates imply 
ARRA spending created or saved about 2.0 million jobs, or 1.5% of pre-ARRA total nonfarm 
employment, in that first year.  The estimated employment effect is estimated to have grown 
further over time, reaching 3.4 million (based on announced funds) by March 2011.  The 
estimates are moderately larger if one measures ARRA spending by obligated funds or actual 
outlays.  Despite the use of a very different methodology, these estimates are in line with the 
range of estimates of the ARRA’s impact generated by studies using the macroeconometric 
modeling approach. 
It should be emphasized that the stimulus effects estimated in this paper correspond to the 
effects of one particular stimulus program enacted in a unique economic environment.  There are 
at least two reasons why the ARRA’s spending effects are not likely to be generally applicable to 
the question of the effects of fiscal stimulus in other contexts.  First, the ARRA was unusual 32 
 
relative to previous stimulus programs in the U.S. and elsewhere in that it focused heavily on 
infrastructure spending and fiscal aid to state governments.  These types of spending may well 
have different multipliers than federal government consumption expenditures.  Second, the 
ARRA was enacted in a unique, and in many ways unprecedented, economic environoment.  The 
U.S. economy was in the midst of its most severe economic downturns since the Great 
Depression.  The resulting underutilization of resources could have made fiscal stimulus more 
effective than it would be in a more normal environment (see, for example, the results of 
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko finding that the fiscal multiplier is higher in downturns).   
Furthermore, monetary policy during the 2007-2009 recession and subsequent recovery was 
arguably stuck at the zero lower bound, or at least heavily restrained in its accommodative 
abilities.  A number of theoretical studies have found that fiscal multipliers should be larger 
when monetary policy is less accommodative.   
Further empirical research is clearly warranted to study the extent to which the effects of 
fiscal spending along these dimensions.  It is hoped that this paper serves as an illustration of 
how cross-regional variation in fiscal spending, combined with exogenous determinants of this 
variation, can provide useful reduced-form evidence on this question and can serve as a 
complement to vector auto-regression and model-contingent approaches. 
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Agency Totals (Billions) and Percentages
March 2011
Announcements Obligations Payments
Dept. of Education (ED) 89.1 (31.5) 94.6 (31.7) 66.0 (32.9)
Dept. of Transportation (DOT) 34.7 (12.3) 38.0 (12.7) 21.7 (10.8)
Other 103.5 (36.6) 53.0 (17.8) 19.8 (9.8)
Dept. of Health and Human Services (HHS) 55.6 (19.7) 112.9 (37.8) 93.2 (46.4)
Total (excluding Dept. of Labor) 282.9 (100.0) 298.5 (100.0) 200.6 (100.0)Table 2
Selected Variables, as of February 2010
States Ranked by Predicted ARRA Announcements
Rank State Predicted Announcements Actual Announcements HHS instrument ED instrument DOT instrument
1 WY 1542 1096 48 .273 296
2 ND 1461 1331 48 .291 270
3 AK 1409 2168 85 .296 224
4 SD 1264 1290 47 .278 229
5 MT 1231 1476 46 .269 225
6 VT 1196 1026 105 .264 165
7 NM 957 1187 81 .274 127
8 RI 937 828 99 .265 109
9 MS 903 846 68 .29 120
10 NE 876 747 52 .283 131
11 ME 868 1046 93 .246 104
12 AR 865 746 66 .267 122
13 NY 864 803 138 .262 57
14 WV 858 883 73 .246 120
15 OK 847 755 55 .276 124
16 DE 821 899 69 .258 111
17 KS 818 634 47 .284 122
18 ID 815 996 43 .291 122
19 MO 811 701 68 .27 106
20 IA 806 756 51 .275 118
21 LA 799 823 72 .282 95
22 MN 788 628 75 .27 94
23 AL 773 653 54 .27 109
24 CT 760 571 75 .266 89
25 KY 755 651 65 .263 98
26 TN 740 773 70 .259 91
27 MA 737 696 96 .258 67
28 IN 735 656 49 .277 102
29 SC 735 925 55 .264 101
30 PA 731 604 78 .258 82
31 WI 708 554 53 .272 94
32 OH 706 595 69 .267 81
33 NH 700 1028 54 .262 94
34 TX 698 723 51 .286 89
35 MI 697 541 57 .278 85
36 GA 682 541 43 .28 94
37 AZ 677 769 62 .27 79
38 NC 669 505 62 .267 78
39 IL 649 719 60 .277 72
40 NJ 647 347 63 .257 75
41 MD 645 805 59 .265 76
42 CA 633 564 59 .279 69
43 OR 631 693 46 .256 87
44 UT 631 659 30 .326 78
45 VA 618 641 39 .266 88
46 HI 613 1057 52 .251 79
47 WA 605 968 53 .259 74
48 CO 573 680 36 .264 80
49 FL 547 553 45 .244 72
50 NV 539 433 29 .264 78Table 3
Summary Statistics, Sample Period: Feb 09-Feb 10
Panel A: Dependent Variables
Mean SD Min Max N
Change in Employment (p.c.), Total Nonfarm -0.0151 0.0051 -0.0276 -0.0019 50
Change in Employment (p.c.), Private Employment -0.0145 0.0046 -0.0272 -0.0042 50
Change in Employment (p.c.), S&L Government -0.0008 0.0010 -0.0028 0.0018 45
Change in Employment (p.c.), Construction -0.0030 0.0019 -0.0128 0.0006 44
Change in Employment (p.c.), Manufacturing -0.0034 0.0014 -0.0073 -0.0008 47
Change in Employment (p.c.), Educ and Health 0.0005 0.0006 -0.0008 0.0020 49
Change in the Unemployment Rate 0.0143 0.0077 0.0000 0.0430 50
Panel B: Explanatory Variables
Mean SD Min Max N
Announcements (p.c.) 811.4 303.8 347.0 2,167.8 50
Obligations (p.c.) 811.0 169.2 574.6 1,452.8 50
Payments (p.c.) 380.3 79.1 241.6 582.1 50
Dec07-Feb09 Employment (p.c.) trend, Total Nonfarm -0.0223 0.0106 -0.0550 -0.0005 50
Dec07-Feb09 Employment (p.c.) trend, S&L Government -0.0003 0.0008 -0.0025 0.0015 45
Dec07-Feb09 Employment (p.c.) trend, Total Private -0.0220 0.0101 -0.0536 -0.0004 50
Dec07-Feb09 Employment (p.c.) trend, Construction -0.0039 0.0030 -0.0133 0.0001 47
Dec07-Feb09 Employment (p.c.) trend, Manufacturing -0.0051 0.0025 -0.0135 -0.0016 47
Dec07-Feb09 Employment (p.c.) trend, Educ and Health 0.0008 0.0008 -0.0011 0.0025 49
Dec07-Feb09 Employment (p.c.) trend, Unemployment 0.0314 0.0113 0.0100 0.0540 50
Feb09 Employment (p.c.) Level, Total Nonfarm 0.4481 0.0415 0.3773 0.5676 50
Feb09 Employment (p.c.) Level, S&L Government 0.0706 0.0126 0.0495 0.1166 45
Feb09 Employment (p.c.) Level, Total Private 0.3682 0.0362 0.2928 0.4490 50
Feb09 Employment (p.c.) Level, Construction 0.0224 0.0057 0.0139 0.0459 47
Feb09 Employment (p.c.) Level, Manufacturing 0.0419 0.0155 0.0157 0.0813 47
Feb09 Employment (p.c.) Level, Educ and Health 0.0649 0.0150 0.0366 0.0983 49
Feb09 Employment (p.c.) Level, Unemployment Rate 0.0759 0.0182 0.0410 0.1200 50
Change in PI 3-yr Moving Average (p.c.), 2005 to 2006 0.0008 0.0005 -0.0002 0.0025 50
Tax Benets (p.c.) 563.7 110.5 434.6 921.0 50
2003-2007 House Price Growth 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.9 50
Panel C: Instruments
Mean SD Min Max N
DOT instrument 111.0 51.497 57.326 296 50.0
School-aged population share 0.270 0.014 0.244 0 50.000
FY2007 p.c. Medicaid spending * 6.2 percent 61.9 20.1 29.2 138 50.0Table 4
First-stage results, as of Feb 2010
Announcements (Thous. Per Cap) Obligations (Thous. Per Cap) Payments (Thous. Per Cap)
/SE /SE /SE
HHS instrument (thous. per cap) 3.838 6.151 3.187
(1.672) (0.831) (0.500)
DOT instrument (thous. per cap) 3.402 1.987 0.467
(0.758) (0.377) (0.226)
ED instrument 2.391 0.904 1.232
(2.031) (1.009) (0.607)
Change in PI Moving Average -128.698 -53.414 -44.334
(68.394) (33.992) (20.444)
Tax Benets (thous. per cap) -0.602 0.070 0.165
(0.335) (0.166) (0.100)
Dec07-Feb09 trend 7.416 -0.880 -1.814
(3.639) (1.808) (1.088)
Feb09 level -0.340 0.056 0.159
(0.898) (0.446) (0.268)
2003-2007 house price growth 0.729 0.184 0.070
(0.177) (0.088) (0.053)
Constant 0.025 -0.148 -0.398
(0.735) (0.365) (0.220)
N 50 50 50
R
2 0.714 0.772 0.623
Table 5
Second-stage results, as of Feb 2010
Dependent Variable: Change in Employment:Population Ratio, Feb 09-Feb 10
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
/SE /SE /SE /SE /SE /SE
Announcements (Mill. Per Cap) 4.304 8.075 - - - -
(2.372) (3.540)
Obligations (Mill. Per Cap) - - 6.736 11.694 - -
(3.550) (4.110)
Payments (Mill. Per Cap) - - - - 13.016 22.792
(7.062) (9.189)
Change in PI Moving Average -4.819 -4.519 -4.983 -4.852 -4.698 -4.351
(1.350) (1.306) (1.335) (1.267) (1.358) (1.307)
Tax Benets (Mill. Per Cap) 13.215 18.270 7.960 8.341 4.809 2.831
(5.902) (6.711) (4.962) (4.709) (5.167) (5.061)
Dec07-Feb09 trend 0.258 0.194 0.271 0.227 0.302 0.279
(0.070) (0.082) (0.066) (0.066) (0.060) (0.059)
Feb09 level -0.035 -0.040 -0.031 -0.033 -0.029 -0.028
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013)
2003-2007 house price growth 0.001 -0.002 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Constant -0.001 -0.005 -0.002 -0.006 -0.001 -0.004
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
N 50 50 50 50 50 50
R
2 0.580 0.555 0.582 0.563 0.581 0.562
Robust First-Stage F 9.448 27.836 15.447
Overidentifying restrictions test (p-
value)
0.154 0.602 0.231Table 6
IV Regression Results, alternative specications and data choices
Coecient on ARRA spending measure
Announcements Obligations Payments
/SE /SE /SE
Baseline 8.075 11.694 22.792
(3.540) (4.110) (9.189)
No controls 7.258 18.266 47.852
(2.990) (4.572) (12.243)
Control for population 10.797 12.214 22.408
(4.548) (3.863) (7.854)
BLS Sampling Weights 8.053 11.244 21.571
(3.461) (4.201) (9.328)
QCEW 5.208 16.852 43.150
(2.522) (4.119) (13.708)
Drop Outliers (MT, SD, AK, ND, WY) 19.386 14.990 24.246
(8.218) (4.625) (8.780)
Sensitivity to Instruments
Drop ED instrument 9.080 12.102 27.190
(3.690) (4.145) (9.851)
Drop HHS instrument 5.918 13.150 34.910
(3.833) (7.109) (28.407)
Drop DOT instrument 8.378 10.734 19.245
(6.617) (5.000) (9.518)
Sensitivity to choice of "pre-treatment" period
Jan 09 10.254 13.006 26.310
(3.761) (4.041) (9.587)
Dec 08 9.468 16.056 33.825
(5.250) (5.638) (12.638)
Nov 08 10.666 16.513 36.032
(5.108) (5.746) 13.608)
Table 7
IV Regression Results, by Industry
Coecient on ARRA spending measure
Total Nonfarm Private Nonfarm S&L Govt Construction Manufacturing Educ. & Health
/SE/F /SE/F /SE/F /SE/F /SE/F /SE/F
Announcements
(Mill. Per Cap)
8.075 3.965 3.005 3.590 0.820 0.567
(3.540) (3.097) (0.846) (0.950) (0.467) (0.387)
9.448 10.253 8.130 12.941 20.060 22.450
Obligations (Mill.
Per Cap)
11.694 9.660 2.670 3.417 1.265 1.257
(4.110) (3.742) (0.886) (1.347) (0.666) (0.659)
27.836 27.237 32.095 31.071 42.382 26.132
Payments (Mill.
Per Cap)
22.792 21.795 5.322 6.756 3.253 3.847
(9.189) (8.260) (2.298) (3.369) (1.749) (1.967)
15.447 15.266 13.563 14.643 15.621 8.830Figure 2
ARRA Spending Measures Over TimeFigure 3
Employment in High vs Low Predicted Stimulus StatesFigure 4
Change in Employment vs Predicted ARRA Announcements
(in per capita terms)Figure 5
Jobs Multiplier Coecient Over TimeFigure 6
Falsication Test